Investigating Crimeware Name Servers
Very few security products and services give enough consideration to the reputation and quality of the name server associated with the domains they are looking at.
Example
In this example, we pick a High Value Suspicious Domain and check what else is on the same name server to examine what is discovered through the process.
Our seeding domain will be service-update[.]link
Looking at the name server info from our API
“domain”: “service-update[.]link”,
“ns_avg_ttl”: 4149,
“ns_domain”: “dendrite.network”,
“num_domains”: 203,
This is a low density name server where we have only seen 203 domains on it. It has a very low average TTL across all the domains on there which may suggest a lot of changes compared to other name servers.
A quick lookup using our explore API gives us a number of suspicious domains with matching characteristics. These appear to be in two groups.
Group 1:
Commonalities- Tech related theme. Nameserver domain- dendrite.network. Have an A record-AS holder ColoCrossing- Registrar Namesilo- “address”: “Tavernier St., Wall House”,
“city”: “Loubiere”,
“country”: “DM”,
Domain | PTR Record | Potential Target | Registrar |
update-support[.]network | *colocrossing.com | 3 Mobile UK | Registrar |
service-update[.]link | *colocrossing.com | Live soon | Registrar |
hs-securealerts[.]com | *colocrossing.com | HSBC | Registrar |
ref0948a[.]com | *colocrossing.com | unknown | Registrar |
ref0948a[.]com | *colocrossing.com | HMRC | Registrar |
aem-new[.]com | *colocrossing.com | 3 Mobile UK | Registrar |
aempath[.]com | *colocrossing.com | 3 Mobile UK | Registrar |
com-gb[.]mobi | *colocrossing.com | Mobile UK | Registrar |
It appears that Group 1 have either been used maliciously already or are waiting to be used maliciously. Monitoring the “waiting” group for changes is key as this may lead to being able to block their activity once the domain moves into an actively malicious mode. There are a number of ways to do this, such as monitoring for new changes in DNS or associated records. Moving of infrastructure can often mark an activation of a malicious domain. A good example of this is when the domain avsvmcloud[.]com was activated for the Solarwinds breach, it switched to its own name servers for the active part of the campaign.
Group 2:
This group seems to lead to more and more indicators so I’ll post them over time.
Commonalities- Tech related theme. Nameserver domain- dendrite.network. Domains have been aged. Have an A record-AS holder Nice IT Services Group Inc.
– Registrar Namesilo- “address”: “Tavernier St., Wall House”,
“city”: “Loubiere””country”: “DM
Domain | AS Name of IP | Potential Target | Registrar |
Paypalservice[.]support | Nice IT Services | Paypal | Namesilo |
small-url[.]cc | Nice IT Services | adobe and others | Namesilo |
election[.]finance | Nice IT Services | malware download | Namesilo |
Ulsterbankonlineltd[.]com | Nice IT Services | Ulster Bank(RBS) | Namesilo |
Choicebank[.]online | Nice IT Services | Choice Bank/First Choice | Namesilo |
Documentcloud[.]pw | Nice IT Services | adobe and others | Namesilo |
rbscotland-online[.]com | Nice IT Services | Royal Bank of Scotland | Namesilo |
Btctools[.]net | Nice IT Services | Bitcoin Wallet stealer | Namesilo |
gb-kpmg[.]com | Nice IT Services | KPMG | Namesilo |
secure-id[.]cloud | Nice IT Services | Secure ID | Namesilo |
service-ca-verification[.]com | Nice IT Services | Flagged as spammer | Namesilo |
Teamtnt[.]red | Nice IT Services | Malware Downloads | Namesilo |
So just touching on these two groups based on similarities, these of course could be one group, this name server is very heavily used by malicious actors and definitely one threat actor group called Team TNT.
How can I use this information?
All the information above was collected by our API and can be leveraged for threat hunting or detections. The information is pre-collected and cached so new lookups don’t have to be done each time you have a new indicator to check. We’ve already collected all this information and run some analysis on it to give things like reputation scores for the name server, the AS number reputation, the subnet reputation etc.
A security team can use Yara rules over this information to try and find “High Value Malicious Domains “ in their logs or associated IP addresses.
We also have threat hunting API endpoints that gather behavioral clusters for you so you can quickly create your own new intelligence, or we can do it for you.
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